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Abstract
Artikel ini bermaksud untuk menjawab dua pertanyaan; mengapa terjadi krisis demokrasi di Thailand 
dan siapa sebenarnya pemenang dari krisis demokrasi tersebut. Dengan mempertimbangkan semakin 
pentingnya kehadiran kelompok yang sering disebur sebagai Network of Monarchy, artikel ini 
berargumen bahwa krisis demokrasi di Thailand sangat terkait dengan persaingan politik antara 
kubu pro-Thaksin dengan kubu anti-Thaksin yang disponsori oleh kalangan Network of Monarchy. 
Kompetisi politik tersebut tidak hanya terjadi pada tingkat elit, tetapi berubah menjadi keresahan 
politik dan kerusuhan sosial yang melibatkan pertentangan antar kelompok masyarakat yang dicirikan 
oleh penggunaan warna kaos yang berbeda (clash of colored shirts). Meski akhirnya Thaksin berhasil 
diturunkan, artikel ini berpendapat bahwa kemenangan sementara kubu Network of Monarchy ini 
tidak akan berpengaruh banyak bagi stabilitas dan kepastian demokrasi di Thailand, apabila kerangka 
pengaturan demokrasi pasca Thaksin gagal melibatkan partisipasi masyarakat di tingkat akar rumput. 
Terlebih lagi, pemerintah demokratik juga harus mampu mengatasi persoalan ketimpangan ekonomi, 
terutama di wilayah utara. 
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 Introduction
 
 In post 19 September 2006 military coup 
that ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
until now, Thailand entered into a political 
turmoil featured by the widespread of civil unrest 
in various ‘colored shirts’ that represent divided 
camps, between anti- and pro Thaksin. The multi 
coloured mass movement consists of several 
color shirts group. The Red Shirts movement, 
a pro Thaksin Group organised in United Front 
of Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) that 
supported by rural mass especially in the north. 
The Yellow Shirts, an anti-Thaksin  of the People’s 
Alliance for Democracy (PAD) group led by 
Shondi Limthongkul that also supported by the 
palace and urban middle class. The Blue Shirts, 
a group that counter against the red usually in 
violence organised by Newin Chidchob, a former 
pro-Thaksin political leader that well-known in 
mobilising thugs. There was also the White Shirts 
around the journalist and the moderate groups 
who seek a non-violence campaign (Prasirtuk, 
2009; 203-210).   Interestingly, the choice of 
colours represents a unique symbol. Yellow is the 
color of Buddhism and also related to Monday, 
the day of the King’s birth, while the blue color 
represents the queen. The white colour associated 
with Thai’s Flag of nation-based Unity. Red 
colour has no clear connection with Thai culture 
and Monarchy symbols (Dressel, 2010; 445). 
This political crisis marked a setback 
of Thailand democracy that started at 1992 
and the prospect of political reform is loom. 
The ongoing political crisis showed by the 
occupation of Government House and the closed 
down of Bangkok’s airport in the late of 2008 
by the Yellow Shirts supporters, the disruption 
of ASEAN Summit in Pattaya in April 2009 by 
the Red Shirts supporter and the clashes between 
security forces and the Red Shirts between March 
and May 2010 that involved at least 90 deaths 
(McCargo, 2010; 8). This essay will explain the 
recent democratic crisis in Thailand and shows 
that the royal associated political groups or 
network monarchy (McCargo, 2005) is the winner 
of recent political conflict and pro-Thaksin 
movement is the loser. However, this stage is just 
a beginning of a protracted conflict to build a sort 
of democratic regime in Thailand.
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Democratisation and the Network of Monarchy
Historically, the path of political change 
(democratisation) in Thailand is widely 
understood as a linear-progressive change from 
absolute monarchy period (ended in 1932), 
military rule (from 1932-1973) and democratic 
reform (from 1992 until now). The ultimate 
challenges of democratisation, in this view, 
are corrupt politicians and money politics, not 
the monarchy or the military. In this kind of 
understanding, the coup in 19 September to expel 
Thaksin Shinawatra from his office and the today 
Thailand’s political turmoil tacitly represent the 
‘democratic reform’ against corrupt politicians 
and money politics. However, as shown by 
Connors, the recent political crisis mirroring 
a struggle between political elites relating to 
political order and the rules of the game (Connors, 
2008; 478-496). In this battle of the rules of the 
game it is interesting to reconsider the active role 
of the monarch in shaping democracy and to gain 
political prominence in Thailand. 
The role of the king in Thailand’s 
democratisation has become a subject of academic 
research since the King Bhumibol Adulyadej 
as an important source of political legitimacy 
directly involved in mitigating several political 
crises mainly in 1973 and 1992 mass uprising 
(Winichakul, 2008; 11-37). More than just 
occasionally direct involvement such as through 
public speeches, the central role of monarchy 
in political development in Thailand has been 
established and reproduced through a sub-
system and a mode of para-political institution 
governance the so-called network monarchy. 
The main characteristics of network 
monarchy are: (1).The monarchy is the render of 
the last political resort in the time of crisis; (2). 
The monarchy is the ultimate source of national 
legitimacy; (3). The King actively involved in 
setting political agenda, especially through his 
annual birthday speeches; (4). The monarchy 
intervention especially has been done through 
privy councillors lead by ex prominent military 
figure and Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond 
(McCargo, 2005; 501-502).  McCargo (2005) 
argues that since 1973 up to now, the network 
monarchy actively involved in political process 
by the king and his proxies, particularly ex-
prime minister Prem Tinsulanond. However, the 
network monarchy never achieved domination in 
political sphere and has to work together with other 
formal political institutions, mainly the elected 
parliamentary. This is proven by the failure of the 
democrat government of Chuan Leekpai which 
was supported by network monarchy from 1992 
to 1995 and led figures that unsympathetic to the 
monarchy such as Banhran Silpa-archa (1995-
1996) and Chavalith Yongchaiyudh (1996-1997) 
in the top of government.
After the 1992 political crisis, the liberal 
faction of network monarchy around Anand 
Panyarachun and Prawes Wasi sought to reinvent 
a new system of monarchical governance based 
on liberal construction and no more rely on 
military and bureaucratic network. According 
to Anand and Prawes, a new institutionalised of 
network monarchy is part of a long project to 
reduce direct involvement of the King in politics 
as well as a preparation to avoid violence conflict 
at the time of royal succession. As a result of 
the new constitution was promulgated in 1997. 
The new constitution also accompanied by new 
institutions such as the Electoral Commission 
and National Human Rights Commission.
Competition between Thaksin and Network of 
Monarchy
 Ironically the 1997 constitution and the 
impact economic crisis paved the way to the rise 
of Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Rhai (Thai 
Loves Thai) Party in January 2001. Thaksin 
victory was based on his personal magnate of a 
pragmatic and successful CEO of multibillionaire 
telecommunication company, his populist appeal 
to rural mass, particularly in the north, north-east 
and central region and off course money politics.
Historically the relationship between the 
palace, the government and the business group 
was not harmonious. But when the economic 
crisis sprang, King Bhumibol promoted the idea 
of “sufficient economy”. This appeal drew many 
supports from Thai middle class and translated 
into the active involvement of domestic business 
elite in controlling the state. Thaksin was benefited 
from this kind of political atmosphere (Hewison, 
2008; 200-201).  In order to strengthen his political 
base in rural area, Thaksin became more populist 
by pouring money to rural areas such as giving 
soft loans for every community, debt moratorium 
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for farmers, universal health care program 
and a people bank. Taksin, actually, was not a 
populist by nature, since his first priority when 
he initially established the TRT was to rescue 
Thai businessman from the economic crisis and 
modernisation in political and economic life. It is 
shown from his slogan “Think new, act new for 
every Thai” (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2008; 62-
83). Moreover, Thaksin also controlled the media 
and arrogantly attack the critics. His growing 
arrogance demonstrated in the war on drug 
campaign in southern region that approximately 
caused more than 2000 extra judicial killing 
(Hewison, 2006; 202).
The hatred against Thaksin mounted 
after the sale of Shin Corporation to Temasek 
holding in a deal worth US$1.9 billion, while 
Thaksin paid no tax (Hewison, 2006; 203). The 
most significant Thaksin’s opponent is Sondhi 
Limtongkhul, a former Thaksin allies. Sondhi 
is a media business millionaire that received 
government support during the economic crisis. 
The relation of Thaksin and Shondi fell out 
when the government expelled a banker that 
supervises Sondhi’s bankruptcy. Sondhi built 
the People Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and 
sought to gain support from the palace. PAD also 
gathered support from Thai middle class to join 
in demonstrations and rallies during 2005 and 
2006. In response to continuing rallies, Thaksin 
called a sudden election in April 2006. 
The growing protest activities of PAD met 
with the contention of network of monarchy 
toward Thaksin. Basically, network of monarchy 
and the King do not like Thaksin for several 
reasons. Firstly, from the beginning Thaksin 
managed to dismantle political networks 
connected to monarchy, particularly in military 
and bureaucracy and replace it with a new 
network based on political-economy, if not 
cronyism (McCargo, 2005; 513). That is why 
there was a competition among Thaksin and 
network monarchy to control military. 
Secondly, in the case of Shin Corporation 
selling, Thaksin neglected the involvement 
of Crown Property Bureau (CPB) - a palace 
owned corporation, in which CPB was among 
Shin Corp’s shareholder. CPB wanted to keep 
Shin Corporation under domestic ownership to 
maintain the honour and royal patronage, while 
Thaksin’s business instinct favoured quick 
profits. No wonder that Thaksin business was not 
only competitor to CPB but also challenged the 
honour status of CPB (Hewison, 2006; 206). 
Thirdly, Thaksin was considered as palace 
competitor in political arena, mainly in reducing 
the symbolic connection between the King and 
the poor. The palace is positioning itself as a 
champion to the poor through many projects to the 
poor and recently to the idea sufficient economy. 
When Thaksin came with different approach to 
the poor by establishing a welfare system, it was 
truly a potential challenge to the king legitimacy 
in the rural areas.
Finally, the ousted of Thaksin by military 
forces arranged by Prem in September 2006 
represents the climax of network monarchy 
effort to become the dominant element in 
Thai democracy. Now the King and his privy 
councillors become the centre stage of political 
struggle and the anti-monarchy elements will 
likely be excluded from political stage.
Conclusion
 It is clear from the explanation above 
that democratic crisis in Thailand rested on 
the competition between Thaksin camp and 
the network of monarchy around the Royal 
supporters. Thaksin’s popularity, from the 
network of monarchy’s perspective had been 
considered as arrogance. Moreover, when 
Thaksin sold the Shin Corp without involving 
the Crown Property Bureau-a company that often 
associated with the Royal family, Thaksin was 
accused as jeopardizing national economy.
To answer the question of who are the 
winners and losers of Thai democracy, this paper 
shows that the ousted of Thaksin paved the way 
for the network of monarchy to the centre of 
political power. Nevertheless, the influence of 
Thaksin in Thai’s politics has already taken root. 
The stability of Thai’s democracy more or less 
will be affected by the grievances of the north and 
the northeast of Thailand that until now become 
the supporter of Thaksin. The new democratic 
institution should address the social discontent of 
the unlucky people in the north and strengthened 
the grass root participation in all level-decision 
making process. If these issues are failed to be 
addressed, new populist and new Thaksin will 
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take advantage of social discontent, and the 
political crisis will continue to prevail.
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